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CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE STATE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS FOR SECTION 1983 CLAIMS AFTER
WILSON V. GARCIA: A THEORY APPLIED TO
MARYLAND LAW
Stephen J. Shapirot
Forty-two U.S. C section 1983 provides individuals with a
federal cause of action for violations of their constitutional rights
by persons acting under color of state law. The statute itself contains no limitations period for the filing of suits and, in keeping
with settled federal practice, the lower federal courts have looked
to state law to determine the proper limitations period. Because
the lower courts adopted various inconsistent approaches to determining the appropriate state limitations period, the Supreme
Court, in Wilson v. Garcia, held in 1985 that the federal courts
should adopt the state limitations period for personal injury actions. In approximately half of the states, however, there are two
limitations periods for personal injury actions: a shorter period
for certain named intentional torts and a longer period for the
residue ofpersonal injury actions. The lower federal courts have
split on the question of which of the two limitations periods
should be applied. This article examines the rationale employed
by the courts in selecting either the shorter or longer limitations
period. The article then presents a theory that supports adoption
of the longer, general personal injury limitations period rather
than the shorter limitations period applicable to intentional torts.
The article concludes with the application of this theory to Maryland statutory law.
INTRODUCTION

I.

Forty-two U.S.C. section 1983 (section 1983) 1 provides individuals
with a federal cause of action for violations of their constitutional and
other federal statutory rights by persons acting under color of state law. 2

t

B.A., 1971, Haverford College; J.D., 1976, University of Pennsylvania School of
Law; Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Originally, section 1983 was part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982).
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Since the revival of the section 1983 cause of action in the 1960's, 3 federal
courts have struggled to determine the proper statute of limitations for
such actions. The judiciary has had to address the question because
there is neither a statute of limitations contained in the text of section
1983 nor a federal statute of limitations specifically applicable to such
actions. 4 Generally, when Congress fails to establish a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, the settled federal practice has been to
adopt a state limitations period, provided the state limitations period is
not inconsistent with federal law or policy. 5 With regard to section 1983
and the other reconstruction civil rights statutes, Congress specifically
has endorsed the adoption of state law where there is no federal rule by
enacting 42 U.S.C. section 1988. 6
Before Wilson v. Garcia/ the Supreme Court had held that federal
courts must choose "the most appropriate'' 8 or "the most analogous" 9
3. Early Supreme Court cases interpreting the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts had
given these statutes a very narrow reach. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 ( 1961 ), however, the Court held that the section 1983 remedy was supplementary to any state tort remedy, and that a plaintiff could bring a federal lawsuit regardless of whether relief might be available under state law. /d. at 183. The
Monroe decision has led to a revival of the section 1983 suit that some commentators have refered to as a "flood" or "explosion" of such suits. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1980); McCormack, Federalism and Section
1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60
VA. L. REV. 1 (1974).
4. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985).
5. /d. at 266-67 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)); Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154 (1905);
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). This statute provides, in part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this Title, and ofTitle "CIVIL RIGHTS," and
of Title "CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States
in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws
are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to
furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the
trial and disposition of the cause ....
42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1982).
Thus, section 1988 requires the courts to follow federal law if applicable. If no
federal rule exists, then the applicable state law should be followed, unless the state
law is inconsistent with the Constitution or federal law. Burnett v. Grattan, 468
U.S. 42, 47 (1984). Courts have adopted two solutions if the applicable state law is
inconsistent with the Constitution or federal law. The court may choose another
state law. Id. at 55. Alternatively, the court may create a federal common law rule.
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
7. 471 u.s. 261 (1985).
8. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).

244

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 16

state statute of limitations for Civil Rights Act claims. The Court, however, provided little guidance regarding the mechanics of selecting the
most appropriate or most analogous statute. 1° Courts generally took one
of two approaches.'' The first was a case-by-case approach in which the
court would examine the facts of each section 1983 claim and apply the
statute of limitations of the state law cause of action most analogous to
that particular section 1983 claim. 12 This approach led to uncertainty
and litigation because most section 1983 claims can be analogized to
more than one state law cause of action, each of which may be governed
by a different statute of limitations. 13 The other approach was to choose
the state law cause of action most analogous to section 1983 claims and
apply the statute of limitations for that cause of action to all section 1983
claims brought within the state. 14 Although this approach provided uniformity within a state, results varied from state to state because the federal circuits were able to analogize section 1983 claims to different state
causes of action. 1s
In an attempt to bring uniformity to this unsettled area of the law,
the Supreme Court held in Wilson that federal courts should select, in
each state, "the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983
claims." 16 After reviewing the nature and purpose of section 1983
claims, the Court concluded that the most appropriate statute would be
the statute applicable for personal injury tort actions. 17 The Court's effort to provide a uniform approach via this formula has been foiled, however, because many states do not have a single limitations period
applicable to all personal injury actions. Approximately one-half of the
states have one statute of limitations applicable to most personal injury
actions, and a second, shorter statute of limitations applicable to certain
9. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980).
10. "[T]he Supreme Court has been singularly unhelpful in providing guidance on this
important issue of federal law." Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643 (lOth Cir.
1984).
11. For a circuit-by-circuit review on this question, see Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640,
643-48 (lOth Cir. 1984). See also Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate
Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 440, 44243 (1986).
12. See Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1974) (en bane) (court should apply
the limitations period "which would be applicable in the courts of the state in which
the federal court is sitting had an action seeking similar relief been brought under
state law."); accord Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1976); Johnson v.
Dailey, 479 F.2d 86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009 (1973).
13. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272-73.
14. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1000 (1982); Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972).
15. See, e.g., Pauk, 654 F.2d at 866 (all section 1983 claims treated as actions on a
liability created by statute); Almond, 459 F.2d at 204 (all section 1983 claims characterized as claims for personal injuries).
16. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275.
17. Jd. at 276. The Court then affirmed the use of a three-year statute of limitations
governing actions "for injury to the person or reputation of any person." /d. at 280
(citing N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 37-1-8 (1978)).
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named intentional torts. 18 Among these states, federal courts have
18. Twenty-seven states have a statute of limitations for certain intentional torts different than the statute of limitations for most other personal injury actions. In all of
these states except Alabama, the limitations period for intentional torts is the
shorter of the two. States with such dual limitations periods include: Alabama:
ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(1) (Supp. 1986) (two years for "any injury to the person or
rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated"), ALA.
CODE § 6-2-34(1) (1977) (six years "for any trespass to person or liberty, such as
false imprisonment or assault and battery"); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-542 (Supp. 1986) (two years for "injuries done to the person of another"),
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-541 (1956) (one year for malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, libel, or slander); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 37-201 (Supp. 1985)
(one year for assault and battery, false imprisonment, libel, and slander, alienation
of affection or criminal conversation), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-206 (1962) (three
years for "all actions ... founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability"); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN.§ 12-301(4) (1981) (one year for libel, slander,
assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false
imprisonment), D.C. CoDE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1981) (three years for all other actions "for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed"); Kansas: KAN.
STAT. ANN.§ 60-514(2) (1983) (one year for assault, battery, malicious prosecution,
or false imprisonment), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5l3(a)(4) (1983) (two years for injury to "the rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated");
Kentucky: KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 4l3.l40(l)(c),(d) (Baldwin 1979) (one year for
malicious prosecution, arrest, criminal conversation, conspiracy, seduction, libel, or
slander), KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 413.120(7) (Baldwin 1979) (five years for an "injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated"); Maryland: Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CODE ANN.§ 5-105 (1984) (one year for
assault, battery, libel, or slander), Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 5-101
(1984) (three years for all civil actions unless "another provision of the Code" applies); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753 (1980) (two years for assault,
battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, or malpractice), ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 752 (1980) (six years for "all civil actions ... except as otherwise specially
provided"); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5805(2),(3),(7) (West
1987) (two years for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution,
one year for libel and slander), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(8) (West
1987) (three years for "injury to a person or property"); Mississippi: Miss. CODE
ANN. § 15-1-35 (Supp. 1986) (one year for assault, assault and battery, maiming,
false imprisonment, malicious arrest, menace, libel, or slander), Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 15-l-49 (Supp. 1986) (six years for "all actions which no other period of limitations is prescribed"); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-208 (1985) (one year for
libel, slander, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution),
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-207(3) (1985) (four years for "an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated"); New Jersey:
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:l4-3 (West 1952) (one year for libel and slander), N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:l4-2 (West 1952) (two years for "injury to the person caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of any person"); New York: N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. &
R. § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (one year for assault, battery, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, libel, slander, and violation of privacy), N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.
& R. § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (three years for "personal injury" actions);
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § l-54(3) (1983) (one year for libel, slander, assault, battery, or false imprisonment), N.C. GEN. STAT. § l-52(5) (1983) (three
years for "criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of
another, not arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated"); North Dakota:
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (Supp. 1985) (two years for libel, slander, assault,
battery, or false imprisonment), N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-0l-16(5) (Supp. 1985) (six
years for "criminal conversation or any other injury to the person or rights of another not arising upon contract, when not otherwise expressly provided"); Ohio:
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reached inconsistent results in choosing the most appropriate limitations
period. Some courts, emphasizing the broad range of section 1983 actions, have chosen the more general, usually longer limitations period
applicable to most personal injury actions. 19 Other courts, relying on the
historical reasons for the enactment of section 1983, the prevention of
Ku Klux Klan violence, have chosen the special limitations period applicable to intentional torts. 20 To date, the Supreme Court has declined

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.111 (Anderson Supp. 1985) (one year for assault or
battery), OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2305.10 (Anderson Supp. 1985) (two years for
any action for "bodily injury"), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson Supp.
1985) (one year for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or malpractice), OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2305.09 (Anderson Supp. 1981) (four years for
"an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in
[other sections]"); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1987)
(one year for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1987) (two years for "injury
to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated");
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-1-14(a) (1985) (one year for slander), R.I. GEN.
LAWS§ 9-l-14(b) (1985) (three years for "injuries to the person"); South Carolina:
S.C. CODE ANN.§ 15-3-550 (Law Co-op 1977) (two years for libel, slander, assault,
battery, and false imprisonment), S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(5) (Supp. 1986) (six
years for "criminal conversation or for any other injury to the person or rights of
another, not arising on contract, not hereinafter enumerated"); South Dakota: S.D.
CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-15(1) (1984) (two years for libel, slander, assault,
battery, or false imprisonment), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-13(5) (1984)
(six years for "criminal conversation or any other injury to the rights of another not
arising on contract and not otherwise specifically enumerated"); Tennessee: TENN.
CODE ANN. § 28-3-103 (1980) (six months for slander), TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3104 (1980) (one year for all other actions for "injury to the person"); Texas: TEx.
REv. CIV. CODE ANN.§ 16.002 (Vernon 1986) (one year for malicious prosecution,
libel, or slander), TEX. CIV. CoDE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986) (two years for
"personal injury"); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-12-29(4) (1977) (one year for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction), UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-12-25(2) (1977) (four years for "relief not otherwise provided for by law");
Virginia: VA. CoDE§ 8.01-248 (1984) (one year for malicious prosecution or abuse
of process), VA. CODE § 8.01-243A (Supp. 1986) (two years for actions for "personal injuries"); Washington: WASH. ·REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.16.100 (1962) (two
years for libel, slander, assault, assault and battery, or false imprisonment), WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.080(2) (1962) (three years for "injury to the person or
rights of another not hereinafter enumerated"); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.57 (West 1983) (one year for libel, slander, assault, battery, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, "or other intentional tort to the person"), Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 893.54(1) (West 1983) (three years for "injuries to the person"); Wyoming:
Wvo. STAT.§ l-3-105(v) (1977) (one year for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment), Wvo. STAT. § l-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1977)
(four years for any "injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and
not herein enumerated").
19. See, e.g., Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986); Carroll v.
Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 (1986).
20. See, e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250 (lith Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 893 (1986); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1376 (1986); Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2902 (1986).
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three opportunities to resolve this split among the circuits. 21
Maryland is one of the states that has a dual limitations period for
personal injury actions. Most tort claims for personal injuries are governed by Maryland's three-year general statute of limitations. 22 Actions
for assault, battery, libel, or slander are subject to a one-year limitations
period. 23 The Fourth Circuit is yet to rule which of these statutes of
limitations is most appropriate for section 1983 actions.
This article proposes that the general three-year limitations period
should govern section 1983 actions in Maryland. The article first describes the holding and reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilson v. Garcia. It then examines the application of Wilson by lower
courts in states that have statutory limitations periods that are different
for negligent torts and intentional torts. The article then develops a theory, consistent with Wilson, that could be applied where states have two
limitations periods. Finally, the article applies this theory to Maryland's
statutes of limitations and proposes that, in applying Wilson, the Fourth
Circuit should adopt Maryland's general three-year statute of limitations
for all section 1983 actions brought in the state.

II.

WILSON V. GARCIA

In Wilson v. Garcia, 24 the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action in
federal district court against a New Mexico state police officer and the
Chief of the State Police, seeking damages for an allegedly unconstitutional arrest and beating. 25 The complaint was filed two years and nine
months after the incident occurred. 26 The defendant moved to dismiss
the complaint, claiming that the action was barred by the two-year limitation period of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, 27 which the Supreme
Court of New Mexico earlier had held to be applicable to section 1983
actions brought in that state. 28 The federal district court held that the
decision of the state supreme court was not controlling because "characterization of the nature of the right being vindicated under section 1983
is a matter of federal, rather than state, law." 29 Instead, the court held
that all section 1983 actions should be characterized as actions based on
21. Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330
(1986); Mulligan, 777 F.2d 340; Jones, 763 F.2d 1250.
22. Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984) (includes all negligent and
some intentional torts).
23. Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (1984).
24. 471 u.s. 261 (1985).
25. /d. at 263.
26. /d.
27. /d. This section provides: "Actions against a governmental entity or a public employee for torts shall be forever barred, unless such action is commenced within two
years after the date of the occurrence resulting in loss, injury or death .... " N.M.
STAT. ANN.§ 41-4-15(A) (1978).
28. DeVargas v. New Mexico, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
29. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 264 (citing Appendix to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari).
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statute. 30 Because New Mexico had no specific statute of limitations governing statutory claims, the court held that the limitations period of the
three-year residual statute should be applied. 31 Accordingly, the court
denied the motion to dismiss. The court, however, certified an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b). 32
After accepting the interlocutory appeal and hearing the case en
bane, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss. 33 The reasoning
of the Tenth Circuit, however, was different from the reasoning used by
the district court. The Tenth Circuit held that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, all section 1983 claims should be characterized as actions for injuries to personal rights. 34 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit
applied the New Mexico three-year limitations period applicable to personal injury actions, 35 and held that the complaint had been filed in a
timely manner.
Recognizing the confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.3 6 After concluding that 42 U.S.C. section 1988 directs courts to adopt a local limitations period for section 1983 actions,
the Court considered two questions in determining the most appropriate
statute of limitations for this claim. The Court first considered whether
state or federal law governs the characterization of section 1983 claims
for statute of limitations purposes. 37 The Court concluded that Congress
intended the characterization of section 1983 claims to be measured by
federal rather than state standards because of the need for uniform law. 38
The Court then considered "whether all § 1983 claims should be characterized in the same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently
depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal theories
presented in each individual case." 39 The Court observed that, historically, state limitations periods for analogous state causes of action were
adopted to honor the state's balancing of the policies of repose with the
policies of enforcement embodied in the state cause of action. 40 The
Court recognized, however, that because section 1983 is a uniquely federal remedy 41 that can override certain state laws, it can have no precise
30. !d.
31. !d. at 280. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 37-1-4 (1978) provides: "all other actions not herein
otherwise provided for and specified [must be brought] within four years."
32. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 264.
33. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (lOth Cir. 1984).
34. !d.
35. !d. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978) provides: "Actions ... for an injury to the
person or reputation of any person [must be brought] within three years."
36. Wilson v. Garcia, 469 U.S. 815 (1984).
37. 471 U.S. at 268.
38. !d. at 270 (quoting Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)).
39. !d. at 268.
40. !d. at 271.
41. !d. at 271-72 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972)).
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counterpart in state law. 42 Therefore, the Court concluded that analogies to state or common law causes of action "are bound to be
imperfect. " 43
This recognition caused the Court to determine that a single, broad
characterization of all section 1983 claims is best suited to the statute's
remedial purpose. 44 A broad characterization avoids the problems of uncertainty and time-consuming litigation that had been plaguing the caseby-case approach. 45 The Court found that the case-by-case approach
had proved unsatisfactory because many section 1983 claims are analogous to more than one of the common law causes of action, each of
which may be governed by a different limitations period. 46 In that regard, the Court catalogued the many diverse constitutional claims that
could form the basis for section 1983 suits, finding that two or more periods of limitations could apply to each section 1983 claim. 47 The Court
concluded that in the interests of uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation, 48 section 1988 should be construed as a
directive for federal courts to select, in each state, the single most appropriate statute of limitations for all section 1983 claims. 49
The Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that for purposes of the
statute of limitations, all section 1983 claims should be treated as tort
actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries. 50 According to
the Court, the choice of this limitations period was "supported by the
nature of the section 1983 remedy, and by the federal interest in ensuring
that the borrowed period of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy." 51 In reaching this decision, the Court reviewed
the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which Congress had passed to
counter the violent acts committed against southern blacks by the Ku
Klux Klan. The Court observed that the "atrocities that concerned Congress in 1871 plainly sounded in tort. " 52 Although the Court acknowledged that section 1983 encompasses a broad range of potential tort
analogies, ranging from injury to property to infringements of individual
liberty, 53 the Court reasoned that Congress would have considered section 1983 remedies to be more analogous to personal injury claims than
to claims for property damage or breach of contract. 54 Therefore, the
Court determined that had the Forty-Second Congress considered the
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 272 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196, n. 5 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
at 272.
at 272-73.
at 273-74.
at 275.
at 276.
at 277.
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issue, "it would have characterized § 1983 as conferring a general remedy for injuries to personal rights. " 55
After choosing to characterize section 1983 claims as claims for personal injury, the Court explained that periods of limitation for statutory
claims and for state law remedies for wrongs committed by public officials were inappropriate for section 1983 claims. As to statutory claims,
the Court determined that, because statutory claims were relatively
scarce when section 1983 was enacted, it is unlikely that Congress would
have intended to apply these subsequently enacted periods of limitations
to statutory claims. 56 As for state law causes of action for wrongs committed by public officials, the Court reasoned that such a characterization
might allow the state to thwart the federal remedy by selecting a shorter
statute of limitations for such claims. 57
The Wilson Court's express purpose in ruling that there should be
one limitations period in each state for section 1983 actions was to avoid
the uncertainty and litigation caused by the case-by-case approach. The
Court sought to achieve uniformity within each state, doctrinal consistency from state to state, and a limitations period on par with a major
part of each state's civil litigation. 58 The Court recognized that the inconsistency of having the section 1983 limitations period vary from state
to state could not be avoided because Congress had determined that state
law should apply even though the limitations period for personal injury
The unifying theme of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is reflected in the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment that unequivocally recognizes the
equal status of every "person' subject to the jurisdiction of any of the several States. The Constitution's command is that all "persons' shall be accorded the full privileges of citizenship; no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law or be denied the equal
protection of the laws. A violation of that command is an injury to the
individual rights of the person. (footnote omitted).

/d.
55. /d. at 278.
56. /d. Moreover, the Court took the position that most section 1983 claims are not
actually statutory claims at all. "Section 1983, of course, is a statute, but it only
provides a remedy and does not itself create any substantive rights." /d. Although
a few section 1983 claims are based on statute, most are based on Constitutional
rights. The Court noted: "These guarantees of liberty are among the rights possessed by every individual in a civilized society, and not privileges extended to the
people by the legislature." /d. at 278-79.
57. In this regard, the Court stated:
The characterization of all § 1983 actions as involving claims for personal injuries minimizes the risk that the choice of a state statute of limitations would not fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by § 1983.
General personal injury actions, sounding in tort, constitute a major part
of the total volume of civil litigation in the state courts today, and probably did so in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted. It is most unlikely that the
period of limitations applicable to such claims ever was, or ever would be,
fixed in a way that would discriminate against federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law in any respect.
!d. at 279.
58. /d. at 275.
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actions might vary between the states. 59 Despite this inherent problem,
the Court hoped to achieve at least a settled limitations period within
each state. The Court failed to anticipate, however, that in some states
the lower federal courts would have difficulty in choosing the state limitations period for personal injuries due to the existence of two limitations
periods.
III.

CONFUSION IN APPLYING WILSON V. GARCIA

Generally, federal courts in states where one statute of limitations
applies to all claims for personal injury have applied the rule of Wilson v.
Garcia with ease. 60 Where states have differing limitations periods depending upon whether the personal injury aro~e from negligent or intentional conduct, however, the federal courts have had difficulty in
applying the Wilson rule. Approximately one-half of the states have one
statute of limitations for certain named intentional torts and a second
statute of limitations for all other claims of injuries to personal rights. 61
Some courts have applied the limitations period for intentional torts on
the theory that section 1983 was enacted to counter the intentionally tortious conduct of the Ku Klux Klan. 62 Other courts, emphasizing the
59. The only way to achieve complete uniformity of statutes of limitations in all section
1983 cases regardless of the state in which the action is brought is for Congress to
amend 28 U.S.C. § 1988 and to provide by statute a single limitations period for all
section 1983 claims. Commentators have recommended such amendment. See
Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of Limitations for Section
1983 Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 440, 452 (1986). Congress, however, has
refused to enact a number of bills that would have adopted a uniform statute of
limitations for all section 1983 actions. See, e.g., S. 436, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 12874, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
60. See, e.g., Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1986) (one-year period under
Tennessee law); McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1986)
(one-year period under California law); DeNardo v. Murphy, 781 F.2d 1345 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Alaska two-year period); Knoll v. Springfield Township School Dist.,
763 F.2d 584 (3rd Cir. 1985) (Pa. two-year period).
A separate area of dispute among the circuits has been whether the Wilson
opinion should be applied retroactively to cases which have been filed but not decided. Compare Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 2902 (1986) (Wilson to be applied retroactively) with Gibson v. United States,
781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 928 (1987) (Wilson not to be
applied retroactively to shorten statute of limitations). The Supreme Court recently
addressed the retroactivity issue in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617
(1987), a case involving the appropriate statute of limitations for cases brought
under another civil rights statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1981. After first holding that section
1981, like section 1983, should be governed by the state statute of limitations for
personal injury actions, the Court held that the Pennsylvania two-year statute of
limitations should be applied retroactively, since there had been no "clear precedent" in the state adopting a longer statute. 107 S. Ct. at 2622.
61. See supra note 18.
62. Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250 (lith Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct
893 (1986); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1376 (1986); Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct 2902 (1986).
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broad range of present day section 1983 claims, have applied the more
general tort statute. 63
This confusion never would have arisen had the Supreme Court chosen to grant certiorari, not to Wilson, but to one of two other cases decided by the Tenth Circuit the same year as Wilson: Hamilton v. City of
Overland Park 64 and Mishmash v. Murray City. 65 In Wilson, the
Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that for statute of limitations purposes, all section 1983 cases should be treated as actions for
injury to personal rights. 66 The states in which the two other Tenth Circuit actions were filed, however, had more than one statute of limitations
for personal injury actions. In Hamilton, a case arising in Kansas, the
Tenth Circuit had to choose between two statutorily prescribed limitations periods for personal injury. In Kansas, a one-year limitations period applies to actions for "assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or
false imprisonment," 67 whereas a two-year limitations period applies to
actions for "injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and
not herein enumerated." 68 The Tenth Circuit chose to apply the latter,
two-year statute of limitations on the ground that "all section 1983
claims should be characterized as actions for injury to the rights of another."69 In Mishmash, a case arising in Utah, the court also was confronted with two statutes of limitations for personal injury actions: a
one-year statute which governs actions for "libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction," 70 and a four-year statute for all
personal torts not specifically mentioned in the one-year statute. 71 Because the court found no Utah statute "expressly applicable to actions for
injury to the rights of another," 72 it applied the four-year statute of limitations. 73 Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari in either Hamilton
or Mishmash, it would have had to address the issue of which personal
injury statute of limitations should be applied in situations where there
are two limitations periods under state law. Courts in states with two
limitations periods, one for intentional torts and one for other torts,
63. Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 296 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986); accord Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 (1986).
64. Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
u.s. 1052 (1985).
65. Mishmash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1052 (1985). Hamilton and Mishmash were appealed to the Supreme Court at approximately the same time as Wilson. The Court denied certiorari in those cases the
same week it issued the Wilson opinion.
66. Wilson, 469 U.S. at 276.
67. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-514(2) (1983).
68. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-513(a)(4) (1983).
69. Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613,614 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 u.s. 1052 (1985).
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29(4) (1977).
71. Mishmash, 730 F.2d at 1367.
72. /d.
73. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(2) (1977).
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would have been provided with clear guidance in determining which limitations period to apply in section 1983 actions.
The first court to address the limitations' problem after Wilson was
the Eleventh Circuit in Jones v. Preuit & Mau/din. 74 In Jones, the court
was forced to choose between two Alabama statutes of limitations. A six
year limitations period applied to actions "for any trespass to person or
liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and battery." 75 A one-year
statute applied to actions for "any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this
section." 76 The court recognized that not all section 1983 claims redressed intentional deprivations of constitutional rights and that some
section 1983 claims will sound in trespass and others in trespass on the
case.7 7 The court decided to apply the six-year trespass statute, which
covered most intentional torts, because "personal injuries sounding in
trespass make up the most significant subset of claims within Section
1983." 78 The court observed that the typical personal injuries covered by
the statute, those that motivated the Congressional enactment, were acts
of intentional and direct violence on the part of the Ku Klux Klan. 79
The court held, therefore, that the longer statute of limitations period
applied and that, consequently, the suit was not time barred. 80
It is unfortunate that Jones was the first case to reach the federal
courts after Wilson. The Alabama statutes at issue in Jones provided a
significantly longer statute of limitations for intentional torts than for
negligent torts. In every other state, however, the limitations period for
intentional torts is shorter than that provided for negligent torts. 81 Some
courts deciding subsequent cases, however, have tended to follow the
Jones rationale despite this significant distinction.
Gates v. Spinks, 82 the next case to address this issue, is illustrative of
this tendency. In Gates, the Fifth Circuit had to decide which of two
Mississippi statutes of limitations to apply. The Fifth Circuit expressly
74. 763 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1985).
75. ALA. CODE § 6-2-34(1) ( 1975). The Alabama courts had applied this six-year limitations period to what had been trespass actions under the common Jaw, that is,
intentional acts done with force and immediately injurious to the person or property
of another. C.O. Osborn Contracting Co. v. Alabama Gas Corp., 273 Ala. 6, 135
So. 2d 227 (1961).
76. ALA. CoDE § 6-2-39(a)(5) (1975). This statute was repealed in 1985 and replaced
with a two-year statute, now codified at ALA. CODE § 6-2-38( I) (Supp. 1986 ). The
one-year limitations period has been applied to actions for trespass on the case,
defined as a wrongful act causing harm only indirectly or without an intentional act
of force. Smith & Santon Funeral Directors v. Dean, 262 Ala. 600, 80 So. 2d 222
(1958); Jones, 763 F.2d at 1254 n.4 (citing W.T. Ratliff Co. v. Henley, 405 So. 2d
141 (Ala. 1981)).
77. Jones, 763 F.2d at 1255.
78. /d.
79. /d.
80. /d. at 1256.
81. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (lOth Cir. 1984).
82. 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985).
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adopted the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Jones and chose to apply
a one-year statute, which it found applicable to most, if not all, common
law intentional torts, 83 rather than a six-year residual statute governing
most unintentional tort actions, including negligence actions and most
strict liability actions. 84 The court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning that Congress's intent in enacting section 1983 was to stem
intentional violence. 85 The Fifth Circuit did not confine itself to this historical analysis, however. The court focused on the broader range of
present day section 1983 actions and stated that "[m]ost 1983 actions are
predicated on intentional rather that negligent acts." 86
Although the holding and reasoning of Jones and Gates are similar,
the results necessarily differ because of the difference between Alabama
and Mississippi law. As noted above, Alabama law is quite unusual in
that the statute of limitations for intentional torts is longer than the limitations period for negligent torts. 87 In Mississippi, as in every other state
with dual limitations periods, the limitations period for intentional torts
is significantly shorter than that for other torts. If courts in those states
find that the statute of limitations for intentional torts is the appropriate
statute for section 1983 actions, the result would be a comparatively
short limitations period for section 1983 actions. 88
Although both the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits applied the limitations period for intentional torts, the First Circuit took a different approach in Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast. 89 In determining which of
Maine's statutes of limitations should apply to section 1983 actions, the
First Circuit decided not to apply Maine's two-year limitations period for
the intentional torts of assault and battery, and for false imprisonment,
slander, libel, and malpractice of physicians. 90 Instead, the court applied
83. Jd. at 919. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (1972) provided that "all actions for assault, assault and battery, maiming, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, or menace, and all actions for slanderous words concerning the person or title, and for
libels, shall be commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued,
and not after."
84. Gates, 771 F.2d at 919 (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1972) (six year residual
statute)). The court affirmed the dismissal of the case because it was not filed within
one year of the accrual of the cause of action. Gates, 771 F.2d at 920.
85. Jd. at 919. "There is no room for disagreement with the Eleventh Circuit that '[t]he
paradigmatic personal injuries covered by the statute, those that motivated the Congress to take action, were acts of intentional and direct violence on the part of the
Ku Klux Klan.'" Id. (quoting Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 713 F.2d 1250, 1255
(lith Cir. 1985)).
86. Id. at 920.
87. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
88. Of the twenty-seven states that have a different statute of limitations for intentional
torts than for other personal injury actions, twenty have a limitations period for
intentional torts of one year or less. In twenty-five of the twenty-seven states with
dual limitations periods, the period for intentional torts is either one-half or onethird the length of the period for other personal injury actions. See supra notes 6087 and accompanying text.
89. 796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986).
90. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753 (1964).
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Maine's six-year limitations period used for virtually all other personal
injury claims. 91 In choosing Maine's longer unintentional tort limitations period, the First Circuit focused on the present day myriad assortment of section 1983 claims 92 rather than on the historical basis for
section 1983 claims. According to the First Circuit, the Supreme Court
had characterized section 1983 claims as personal injury claims "in an
effort to encompass the broad range of potential tort analogies section
1983 has been used to invoke. "9 3
Nevertheless, not all courts faced with a statutory scheme similar to
Maine's have reached the same result. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has
reached seemingly inconsistent results when faced with similar state statutes. In Mulligan v. Hazard, 94 one Sixth Circuit panel applied Ohio's
one-year statute applicable to actions for libel, slander, assault, battery,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or malpractice, 95 rather than
the two-year statute applicable to actions "for personal injury." 96 As had
the Eleventh Circuit in Jones and Gates, 97 this panel looked to the historical basis for section 1983 and reached the conclusion that the statute
applicable to actions involving assaults and batteries "more specifically
encompasses the sorts of actions which concerned Congress as it enacted
the civil rights statutes." 98 In Carroll v. Wilkerson, 99 however, a different
Sixth Circuit panel applied Michigan's three-year statute of limitations
91. Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 546-47 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (1964)):
All civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of
action accrues and not afterwards, except actions on a judgment or decree
of any court of record of the United States, or of any state or of a justice of
the peace in this State, and except as otherwise specially provided.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (1964). The court, therefore, reversed the dismissal of a police officer's suit for deprivation of his property interest in his position
without due process. Small, 796 F.2d at 550.
92. Small, 796 F.2d at 546.
93. !d. The court noted that the Supreme Court in Wilson had listed many examples of
the "numerous and diverse topics and subtopics" that had been the subject of section 1983 suits. !d. (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 273). The court stated:
These suits are not easily characterized as "trespass" claims or "trespass on the case" claims, nor does the "intentional" - "unintentional" dichotomy contribute to the analysis of many claims, such as those based on
challenged legislation or regulations. These suits are not primarily or even
nearly analogous to assault and battery, false imprisonment, or defamation. At best, these suits can only be characterized very generally as
claims involving "personal injuries."
Small, 796 F.2d at 546.
94. 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2902 (1986).
95. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson 1981). This statute has been
amended. See supra note 18 for the current versions of the Ohio statutes of
limitations.
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2305.10 (Anderson 1981).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 74-86.
98. Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2902
(1986).
99. 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 (1986).
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for personal injury claims, 100 even though Michigan had shorter limitations periods for assault, battery, or false imprisonment, 101 malicious
prosecution, 102 and libel or slander. 103 Although the court was aware of
the Mulligan decision, 104 it did not discuss the apparent split within the
circuit on this issue. This discrepancy did not escape Justice White, however, who used it as the basis of his dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Carrol/. 105 Justice White would have granted certiorari in order to resolve the confusion over which state statute of limitations should be applied in section 1983 cases when more than one state statute addresses
such claims. 106

IV.

PROPOSED THEORY

Courts choosing to apply the statute of limitations for intentional
torts have emphasized that the Forty-Second Congress, in passing section
1983, was trying to remedy the intentional violence of the Ku Klux
Klan. 107 Courts choosing to apply the limitations period for other personal injury actions have emphasized the broad range of present day section 1983 actions. 108 The Supreme Court's opinion in Wilson v.
Garcia 109 does not clarify which approach should be taken because the
opinion emphasizes both the historical basis of section 1983 110 and the
broad range of present day actions. 111
In Wilson, the Court noted that Congress's purpose in borrowing
the appropriate state statute of limitations for section 1983 claims was to
incorporate "the State's judgment on the proper balance between the policies of repose and the substantive policies of enforcement embodied in
the state cause of action." 112 If the goal of section 1988 is to honor each
state's judgment regarding limitations periods, the statute of limitations
should be based on the type of cases that actually are being brought
under section 1983, rather than on the type of case that Congress had
thought might be brought when it enacted the statute more than a hundred years ago. 1 13
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(8) (West 1986).
!d. § 600.5805(2) (West 1986) (two years).
/d. § 600.5805(3) (West 1986) (two years).
/d. § 600.5805(7) (West 1986) (one year).
The Carroll court followed the Mulligan court's decision to apply Wilson retroactively. Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 45 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330
( 1986).
County of Wayne v. Carroll, 107 S. Ct. 330, 330 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
/d. at 330 (White, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
471 u.s. 261 (1985).
/d. at 275, 276, 278.
/d. at 273.
/d. at 271.
"When § 1983 was enacted [more than 100 years ago], it is unlikely that Congress
actually foresaw the wide diversity of claims that the new remedy would ultimately
embrace." /d. at 275.
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If the broader range of modern day section 1983 claims is used for
analogy, the most "analogous" statute of limitations in most states
should be that of general personal injury actions rather than that of intentional torts. 114 In the overwhelming majority of states with dual limitations periods for personal injury actions, certain named intentional
torts are subject to a shorter statute of limitations, while all other personal injury actions are subject to a longer limitations period. 115 In such
states, the limited number of named intentional torts would not seem to
be most analogous to the broad range of present day section 1983 actions.
The number of intentional torts covered by the specific statute varies
from state to state. The most narrow statutes cover only slander, or libel
and slander, 116 and obviously would not be most analogous to all section
1983 claims. A more typical statute covers libel, slander, assault, battery, and either or both malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. 117
The broader the coverage of the intentional tort statute, the stronger the
argument that it is the most analogous to section 1983 actions. For example, a statute such as that in Maryland, 118 which applies only to actions for assault, battery, libel, or slander, would cover fewer section
1983 actions than a statute that also covers malicious prosecution and
false imprisonment. 119
It is debatable whether a statute covering a broad range of intentional torts such as assault, battery, libel, slander, malicious prosecution,
and false imprisonment or a residuary statute of all other personal injury
actions, is most analogous to section 1983 claims. On the one hand,
many section 1983 claims, including most of those listed by the Supreme
Court in Wilson v. Garcia, bear no relationship to intentional torts. 120
114. Even if the "paradigmatic" section 1983 action contemplated by the 42d Congress is
chosen to provide the analogy, an argument still can be made, at least in those states
that have a limitations period applicable to only a few intentional torts, that such
torts are not the most analogous to section 1983 actions. See infra text accompanying notes 154-55 for an explanation of this argument.
115. See supra note 18, for a compilation of all states with dual statutes of limitations for
torts.
116. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 1952); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14(a)
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-103 (1980).
117. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805 (Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-208 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 1-54(3) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-01-18
(Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-3-550 (Law Co-op 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 15-2-15 (1984); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN.§ 4.16.100 (1962); WYO. STAT.§ l-3-105(v) (1977).
118. See, e.g., Mo. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (1984).
119. See supra states listed in note 11 7.
120. In Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court gave a partial listing of the "numerous and
diverse topics" covered by section 1983 suits:
[D]iscrimination in public employment on the basis of race or the exercise
of First Amendment rights, discharge or demotion without procedural due
process, mistreatment of schoolchildren, deliberate indifference to the
medical needs of prison inmates, the seizure of chattels without advance
notice or sufficient opportunity to be heard -to identify only a few. [footnotes omitted].
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On the other hand, many section 1983 claims are brought against law
enforcement officers for excessive use of force and similar claims that are
analogous to assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Notwithstanding,
given the Supreme Court's emphasis of the "broad range of potential tort
anaiogies," 121 it seems that even a fairly broad intentional tort statute is
not as analogous to section 1983 claims as is a statute that applies to all
other injuries to the rights of another.
Another reason exists for choosing the more general personal injury
statute of limitations over the statute applicable to intentional torts.
Even in states where it might be argued that the intentional tort statute is
the most "analogous" to section 1983 claims, it may not be the most
"appropriate" statute to use. Although the Supreme Court sometimes
uses the two terms interchangeably, 122 it is unclear whether the most
analogous statute is always the most appropriate statute. In one case, for
example, Burnett v. Grafton, 123 the Court indicated that there may be a
distinction. In Burnett, employees of a Maryland state college brought
suit under sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, claiming racial discrimination in employment. The federal district court dismissed the claims as
barred by the six-month limitations period applicable to a Maryland statute prohibiting racial discrimination in employment. 124 Without disputing that the state employment discrimination statute was the cause of
action most analogous to the actual suit being brought by the plaintiffs, 125 the Supreme Court refused to apply the six-month limitations
period for filing an administrative complaint under the state statute to
the section 1983 claim. The Court held that the state statute was not
"appropriate" because it failed "to take into account practicalities that
are involved in litigating federal civil rights claims and policies that are
analogous to the goals of the Civil Rights Acts." 126 The Court noted

121.
122.

123.
124.
125.

126.

469 U.S. at 273. With the possible exception of "mistreatment of schoolchildren,"
which might be similar to an assault and battery claim, none of the claims listed by
the court bear much resemblance to either assault, battery, libel, slander, malicious
prosecution, or false arrest.
/d. at 277.
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Court spoke of
using the "most appropriate" statute of limitations. /d. at 462. In Board of Regents
v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), the Court used the term "most analogous." /d. at
488. In Wilson, 471 U.S. 261, the Court used both terms together: "the selection of
'the most appropriate' or 'the most analogous' state statute of limitations to apply to
this § 1983 claim." /d. at 268.
468 u.s. 42 (1984).
Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 14 (1929).
Because Burnett was a pre-Wilson case, the courts were searching for the state cause
of action most analogous to the specific section 1983 claim actually being brought,
rather than the present task of trying to choose one state statute of limitations for
all section 1983 claims. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. It was clear that
the state employment discrimination statute was the most analogous to the federal
case.
Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50. The Court conducted the three-step process for determining state law under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See supra note 6. The Court determined,
under the second step, that the six-month period was inappropriate, rather than
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that "[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations period with national interests in mind," 127 and that the reasons for which a legislature
chooses a specific limitations period for a state cause of action may not
apply to section 1983 cases. 128 The Burnett opinion suggests that one
must analyze the state's reasons for choosing a limitations period for a
specific cause of action. If those reasons are inconsistent with the goals
of section 1983, then the statute is not the most appropriate, no matter
how analogous the two causes of action. 129
Analyzing a legislature's motives in adopting a particular limitations
period is exceedingly difficult, however. 130 There is often a paucity of
legislative history because many statutory schemes for limitations periods
are recodifications of statutes that have remained virtually unchanged for
long periods of time. 131 Even modern day state legislative history is
sparse; for older statutes it is virtually nonexistent. Another difficulty in
determining a legislature's motives is that, as noted by one commentator,
the selection of a particular limitations period often "reflects a fairly
complex mixture of purposes, some of which overlap and some of which
may be partly inconsistent with others." 132
The reason usually cited for statutes of limitation is that defendants
should not be forced to defend lawsuits after the facts have become stale
and evidence difficult to procure. 133 One reason for designating a short

127.
128.

129.

130.
131.

132.
133.

holding, under the third step, that it was inconsistent with the Constitution or federal law. The Court did note, however, that "the second and third steps of the
§ 1988 inquiry shade into each other." Burnett, 468 U.S. at 53 n.l5.
!d. at 52 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977)).
The Court stated:
For instance, the length of a limitations period will be influenced by
the legislature's determination of the importance of the underlying state
claims, the need for repose for potential defendants, considerations of judicial or administrative economy, and the relationship to other state policy
goals. To the extent that particular state concerns are inconsistent with,
or of marginal relevance to, the policies informing the Civil Rights Act,
the resulting state statute of limitations may be inappropriate for civil
rights claims.
Id. at 53.
The clearest example of this situation occurs when a state passes a statute of limitation explicitly applicable to federal civil rights actions. In Johnson v. Davis, 582
F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978), the Fourth Circuit rejected a one-year Virginia statute of
limitations expressly applicable to section 1983 claims. This holding was cited with
approval in Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 53, n.l5. The holding of Wilson v.
Garcia by implication clearly rejects the use of state statutes of limitations passed
specifically to apply to section 1983 claims.
See Callahan, Statutes of Limitations- Backround, 16 OHIO ST. L. J. 131 (1955).
Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185
( 1950). For example, the basic Maryland scheme of a one-year limitations period
for assault, battery, libel, or slander and a three-year period for most other causes of
action has remained virtually unchanged since it was enacted in 1715. See I Kilty,
Laws of Maryland, Chap. XXIII, No. II, April 1715.
Callahan, supra note 130, at 132-33.
Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1950). A defendent "ought not to be called on to resist a claim when 'evidence has
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period of limitations for certain intentional torts may be a legislative determination that evidence in such cases would be forgotten or would become unavailable sooner than evidence in other types of tort actions. If
this were the case, then one would expect that there would be a shorter
limitations period for slander, which applies to more easily forgotten spoken words, than for libel, which usually applies to more permanent written words. That most of the statutes in question provide the same
limitations period for libel as for slander 134 tends to refute the notion that
the underlying rationale for the statutes is the transitory nature of evidence. 135 One commentator has suggested that the actual reason for varying periods of limitations, is "the relative favor with which the
legislature looks upon certain types of claims or certain classes of plaintiffs or defendants." 136 Thus, the rationale underlying special statutes
providing for relatively short periods of a year or less may be simply
legislative disfavor of the action or a policy in favor of particularly quick
settlement. 137
If legislatures in states that have a shorter statute of limitations for
intentional torts than for most other actions have chosen the shorter period of limitations because of disfavor of intentional tort actions, such
motives would not be appropriate for federal civil rights actions. State
legislatures may not act to disfavor federal civil rights actions. In fact,
the Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Garcia, chose personal injury actions as
the most appropriate analogy for statute of limitations purposes because
of the "federal interest in ensuring that the borrowed period of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy." 138 As
stated by the Court:
The characterization of all § 1983 actions as involving
claims for personal injuries minimizes the risk that the choice
of a state statute of limitations would not fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by § 1983. General personal injury actions, sounding in tort, constitute a major part of the total
volume of civil litigation in the state courts today, and probably
did so in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted. It is most unlikely
that the period of limitations applicable to such claims ever
was, or ever would be, fixed in a way that would discriminate

134.
135.

136.
137.
138.

been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared,'" /d. (quoting
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
But see TENN. CODE ANN.§ 28-3-103 (1980); R.I. GEN. LAws§ 9-1-14(b) (1985).
See Callahan, supra note 136, at 134. One also might expect actions for assault,
where there usually will be no physical evidence of damages to the plaintiff to have a
shorter limitations period than actions for battery, where plaintiff usually will have
sufferred some physical harm. This also is not the case. See supra note 18.
Leftar, The New Conflicts-Limitations Act, 35 MERCER L. REV. 461, 470 (1984)
(quoting Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1185-86 (1950)).
Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1180
(1950).
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).
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against federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law m
any respect. 139
Intentional torts, however, do not constitute "a major part of the
total volume of civil litigation" 140 in the courts. In many states, intentional torts have been given statutes of limitations considerably shorter
than those for most other actions, including all other personal injury actions. Of the twenty-seven states having limitations periods different for
intentional torts than for other personal injury actions, all states but one
provide a limitations period for intentional torts that is significantly
shorter than that provided for other personal injury actions. 141 Choosing
such statutes of limitation discriminates against federal civil rights actions by treating them as clearly disfavored, rather than typical state
causes of action.
The narrower the class of intentional torts singled out by the state
for inclusion in the shorter statute of limitations, the more discriminatory
the result. 142 Even a statute such as Mississippi's, however, which
prescribes a shorter than usual limitations period for most, if not all,
intentional torts, is not the broad statute of limitations the Wilson Court
thought it was adopting by choosing the limitations period for personal
injury actions. If the shorter limitations period were chosen by the state
legislature because of a hostility toward intentional tort actions, or in an
effort to give defendants in such actions a limited exposure to liability, 143
then such limitations periods should not be chosen for section 1983
actions.
In summary, courts faced with choosing between a limitations periods for certain intentional torts and a limitations period for other personal injury actions should choose the more general personal injury
statute. When a state legislature has chosen to grant a shorter limitations
period for intentional torts than for most other tort actions, then the
intentional tort statute is neither the most analogous to nor the most
appropriate statute of limitations for section 1983 actions. The narrower
the list of intentional torts and the greater the discrepancy in limitation
periods between intentional torts and all other torts, the stronger the argument that the intentional tort statute is not the proper choice.
/d. at 279.
/d.
See supra note 18.
This is obviously not intentional discrimination, such as when a state passes a short
statute of limitations explicitly applicable to section 1983 actions, because the state
could not have known, when it passed the statute, that it would be applied to federal
civil rights actions. The discriminatory effect, however, is the same. Johnson v.
Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978).
143. This is, of course, another reason why legislatures choose short statutes of limitations. However, awarding defendants in federal civil rights actions only a short
period before they may obtain repose also does not seem consistent with the policies
of the Civil Rights Acts, and was, in fact, rejected by the Supreme Court in Burnett
v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1984).

139.
140.
141.
142.
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APPLICATION TO MARYLAND LAW

Maryland, like many of the states discussed in this article, has a
statute of limitations applicable to some intentional torts that is different
from the limitations period applicable to most other personal injury actions. Section 5-105 of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides a oneyear limitations period for "assault, battery, libel, or slander." 144 Virtually all other personal injury actions are governed by Maryland's general
three-year statute of limitations. 145 Under the theory proposed in the
preceding section, the three-year statute is both the most analogous and
most appropriate statute to be applied to section 1983 claims.
The Maryland intentional tort statute, covering only assault, battery, libel, and slander, is narrower than any other statute yet confronted
by the federal courts in this context. Moreover, not only is the statute
narrow by its terms, the courts have been unwilling to extend the statute
to other intentional torts. In Hector v. Weglein, 146 the United States District Court for the District of Maryland applied the one-year limitations
period to a claim for assault and battery, but refused to extend it to
claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
The court applied the general three-year statute to these latter claims. 147
Similarly, in Robinson v. Vitro Corp., 148 another federal district court
judge was requested to apply the one-year statute of limitations to an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because of its alleged
similarity to the torts enumerated in section 5-105. 149 The court refused,
citing the policy of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to construe strictly
the statutes of limitations. 150 Aside from assault and battery, the only
other tort to which the federal district court in Maryland has been willing to extend section 5-105 is false light invasion of privacy, where, be144. "An action for assault, battery, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year from
the date it accrues." Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (1984).
145. "A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless
another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an
action shall be commenced." Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CoDE ANN.§ 5-101 (1984).
Most of the other exceptions to the three-year limitations period are not applicable
to the present situation. See, e.g.,§ 5-102 (twelve-year period for actions on judgments or instruments under seal); § 5-103 (twenty-year period for adverse possession);§ 5-104 (five-year period for action on public officer's bond); § 5-108 (twentyyear period for injuries occurring after completion of improvement to realty); § 5109 (three-or five-year period for malpractice actions against physicians).
146. 558 F. Supp. 194 (D. Md. 1982).
147. /d. at 207.
148. 620 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Md. 1985).
149. /d. at 1072.
I 50. The district court stated:
The Maryland Court of Appeals has further cautioned that 'where
the Legislature has not made an exception in express words in the Statute
of Limitations, the Court cannot allow any implied and equitable exception to be engrafted upon the Statute merely on the ground that such exception would be within the spirit or reason of the statute.'
/d. (quoting McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 160,40 A.2d 313,
316 (1944)).
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cause of the overlap with libel and slander, "[t]o hold otherwise would
allow a plaintiff, in any defamation action where there has been a general
publication to avoid the otherwise applicable one-year statute merely by
phrasing the cause of action in terms of invasion of privacy." 151
If one compares the narrow range of torts covered by section 5-105
with the wider variety of present day section 1983 actions, it is clear that
section 5-105 is not the most analogous statute, because it would govern
only a small fraction of such actions. 152 For this reason, the Maryland
statute is distinguishable from the intentional tort statutes of Alabama,
Mississippi, and Ohio, which have been held to be applicable to section
1983 actions. 153
Even if section 5-105 is compared with the action with which Congress hoped to counter the intentional and direct violence against southern blacks, it probably still is not the most analogous statute. Although
many section 1983 actions against the Ku Klux Klan of the 1930's might
have been for assault and battery, others would have constituted false
arrest, malicious prosecution, or other intentional torts not covered by
the Maryland statute. In fact, because section 1983 contains a requirement that the defendants act under color of state law, 154 actions to redress directly the assaults committed by the Ku Klux Klan might not
151. Smith v. Esquire, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 967, 970 (D. Md. 1980). Accord Robinson v.
Vitro Corp., 620 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (D. Md. 1985). Unlike the traditional invasion of privacy tort that involved statements that were true, the "comparatively
new" false light invasion of privacy action requires, as does defamation, a false statement. A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 69 n.7 265 A.2d 207, 215 n.7 (1970).
The only real difference between false light invasion of privacy actions and defamation actions is that the former requires public as opposed to mere private publication. Hence, many defamation cases also would constitute false light invasion of
privacy claims, thus justifying the courts' fear that defamation plaintiffs could avoid
the applicable one-year limitation period merely by renaming their tort.
152. In Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court stated that the list of claims brought under
section 1983,
[W]ould encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics: discrimination in public employment on the basis of race or the exercise of First
Amendment rights, discharge or demotion without procedural due process, mistreatment of schoolchildren, deliberate indifference to the medical
needs of prison inmates, the seizure of chattels without advance notice or
sufficient opportunity to be heard - to identify only a few.
471 U.S. at 273 (1985).
153. The Alabama statute applied to "any trespass to person or liberty." Jones v. Preuit
& Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250, 1254 (lith Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 893 (1986)
(quoting ALA. CODE § 6-2-39(a)(5) (1975)); the Mississippi statute applied to actions "for assault, assault and battery, maiming, false imprisonment, malicious
arrest, or menace, and all actions for slanderous word concerning the person or title,
and for libels," Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting MISS.
CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (1972)); the Ohio statute, the narrowest of the three, still
covered "libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment
or malpractice." Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson 1983)).
154. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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always have been available. 155 The section 1983 action envisioned by
Congress may not have been an assault and battery action against private
citizens, but an action against public officials or municipalities for encouraging or participating in such acts. Although the actions of such
state defendants usually would be intentional, they would not be limited
necessarily to assaults and batteries. Therefore, section 5-101, which
governs virtually all other personal injury actions except for assault, battery, libel, and slander, seems analogous to present day section 1983 actions as well as to those section 1983 actions contemplated at its passage.
Another reason for choosing the three-year period of section 5-101
over the one-year period of section 5-105 is that the narrow one-year
limitation is inappropriate for section 1983 actions to the extent that it
discriminates against federal civil rights actions. As noted above, when a
state legislature has singled out a few causes of action for shorter limitations periods, there is a strong likelihood that the state disfavors such
causes of action. 156 The one-year Maryland statute applies only to four
torts, two of which, libel and slander, are normally disfavored. 157 It may
be inferred, therefore, that the short limitations period was intended to
discourage these kinds of claims, not to protect against vanishing evidence. 158 Applying the shorter statute of limitations to section 1983 actions would be inappropriate inasmuch as the states may not disfavor
1983 actions.
The three-year limitations period of section 5-101, which applies to
the majority of personal injury actions in Maryland, both intentional and
unintentional, is the more appropriate period to be applied to section
1983 actions. The Supreme Court in Wilson chose "general personal injury actions" 159 as the most appropriate for section 1983 claims not only
because they were most analogous to section 1983 claims, but also because they "constitute a major volume of civil litigation in the state
courts today, and probably did so in 1871 when§ 1983 was enacted." 160
By choosing the three-year limitations period of section 5-101, the federal
courts will be ensuring that federal civil rights plaintiffs will be receiving
155. Private persons may be held liable under section 1983 only if they conspire with
governmental officials. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
157. Libel and slander often are considered disfavored actions and given shorter statutes
of limitations. See Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REv. 1177, 1180 (1950). For more stringent pleading requirements, see 5 WRIGHT
& MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1245, at 217 (1969) ("the standard for successfuly pleading defamation tends to be more stringent than ordinary
civil suits because of the unfavored nature of this type of action").
158. There is no actual legislative history available on this point, because the basic Maryland statute of limitations scheme has remained virtually unchanged since its original passage in 1715. See I Kilty, Laws of Maryland, Chap. XXIII, No. II, April
1715.
159. 471 U.S. at 279.
160. !d.
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treatment similar to the majority of other plaintiffs suing to redress personal injuries in the Maryland courts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court failed to resolve the difficulties experienced by the lower federal courts in determining how to select
the proper state statute of limitations for section 1983 claims. Although
the Court specified that the proper limitations period should be the state
limitations period for personal injury actions, this instruction has provided no guidance in the many states where there are two limitations
periods for personal injury claims. The lower federal courts continue to
grapple with this problem and the federal courts of appeals have divided
on the question.
A correct reading of the Wilson opinion suggests that, in states with
dual limitations periods, the longer period for general personal injury
actions should be selected rather than the shorter period usually allocated for certain named intentional torts. The generalized statutes are
both more analogous to federal civil rights actions and more appropriate
for those actions.
Maryland has a one-year statute of limitations that applies to actions for assault, battery, libel, and slander and a general three-year limitations period that applies to virtually all other personal injury actions.
Of the two limitations periods, the three-year statute is most analogous to
section 1983 actions because it covers the broad range of such actions.
The three-year statute is also more appropriate than the one-year statute
because the narrow scope and short limitations period of the one-year
statute indicates a legislative disfavor that should not be carried over to
federal civil rights actions. To be consistent with the guidelines set forth
in Wilson, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
should adopt a three-year limitations period for all section 1983 claims
and the Fourth Circuit should affirm.

